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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Joshua Dewitt appeals from the district court's order denying his motion to suppress drug
evidence obtained after an officer prolonged a traffic stop to conduct unrelated investigations, in
violation of Mr. Dewitt's Fourth Amendment rights. Mr. Dewitt argues on appeal that the officer
detoured from the mission of the traffic stop, extending his detention, by making unrelated
inquiries into his travel history, then his prescription medications, and finally, by deploying a
drug dog, without reasonable suspicion that Mr. Dewitt was engaged in criminal activity.
Suppression of all evidence should have been granted.
Alternatively, Mr. Dewitt argues that his post-Miranda statements to the officer should
been suppressed because those statements were obtained in response to questioning after
Mr. Dewitt had invoked his right to counsel, in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The following facts were established at the suppression hearing. 1
Officer Michael Marrott was patrolling 1-84 in Jerome County, and noticed a blue
Chrysler, with Illinois plates, make two lane changes without displaying a signal for the requisite
five seconds. (5/29/18 Tr., p.6, L.15 - p.7, L.14.) Mr. Dewitt was driving that car alone, and he
pulled over when the officer activated his lights. (5/29/18 Tr., p.6, L.15 - p.7, L.14.) Officer
Marrott pulled in behind Mr. Dewitt and got out of his patrol car, walked up to Mr. Dewitt's

1

The district court took judicial notice of the May 29, 2018 preliminary hearing transcript
(hereinafter "5/29/18 Tr."), and admitted Officer Marrott's bodycam video (hereinafter "Exhibit
A") (See 7/16/2018 Tr., p.6, Ls.18, Ls.1-23.) Officer Marrott additionally testified at the
suppression hearing. (7/16/2018 Tr., p.6, L.1 -p.38, L.3.)
1

front passenger window, and he immediately identified himself as an officer with the state police
and a K-9 handler. 2 (Ex.A, 11:31:45-50.) The officer then took a few seconds to explain the
traffic lane-change-signal violation he had observed and the related safety concerns. (Ex.A.
11: 31 :55-3 2: 15.)
After explaining the traffic violation, but before requesting Mr. Dewitt's driver's license
and registration, Officer Marrott took approximately forty- five seconds to question Mr. Dewitt
about his travel. (Ex,A., 11:32:20 - 11:33:04; 7/16/18 Tr., p.27, Ls.8-22.) The officer asked
Mr. Dewitt where he was coming from that day and where he was headed. (Ex.A, 11:32:20 11:32:47; 7/16/18 Tr., p.27, Ls.8-22.)

The Officer asked him where his home was, and

confirmed Mr. Dewitt had said Pekin, Illinois; the officer then asked how long Mr. Dewitt had
been out here. (Ex.A, 11:32:47 - 11 :33 :02.) Officer Marrott was unable to relate his request for
travel information to the traffic violation, but testified that the travel question was "a standard
question" he asked everyone. (7 /16/18 Tr., p.27, Ls.16-17.)
Then, after Mr. Dewitt had answered the officer's travel questions, Officer Marrott asked
Mr. Dewitt, "Do you have your driver's license with you?" (Ex.11:33:04) (see also 7/16/18
Tr., p.27, Ls.8-20.) 3 As Mr. Dewitt was retrieving the license, the officer continued questioning
Mr. Dewitt.

He asked Mr. Dewitt if he had any weapons in the car.

(Ex.A., 11:33:10 -

11:33:13.) Then the officer asked whether he had "anything illegal, anything you shouldn't
have."

(Ex.A, 11:33:16.)

Mr. Dewitt answered no to both questions.

(Ex.A., 11:33:10 -

11:33:16.)

2

Officer Marrott had called for a backup officer sometime before making contact with
Mr. Dewitt. (R., p.32 n.2.)
3
Officer Marrott confirmed in his testimony that he had asked Mr. Dewitt about his travel after
explaining the reason for the traffic stop, but before asking Mr. Dewitt for his driver's license
and registration.
2

Immediately following Mr. Dewitt's answers, Officer Marrott engaged Mr. Dewitt in a
line of direct questioning exclusively about drugs. He stated to Mr. Dewitt, "I am a K-9 handler.
So, when I ask you, 'Do you have anything illegal,' let me just ask you a couple questions about
that. Okay? Do you have any methamphetamine?" "Any cocaine?" "Any heroine?" "Any
marijuana?"

(See Ex.A, 11:33:32 - 33:44.)

And Mr. Dewitt answered "No." (See Ex.A,

11 :33:32 - 33:44.)
The officer then asked Mr. Dewitt if he had "prescription pills, anything like that?"
(Ex.A, 11 :33:45) In response to this question, Mr. Dewitt indicated he had prescription pills; and
the officer then asked, "are they prescribed to you?" (Ex.A, 11:33:45-11:34:05.) In response to
this questioning, and as shown by the video and confirmed by Officer Marrott' s subsequent
testimony, Mr. Dewitt "stopped what he was doing" and retrieved the pill bottle from the glove
box, and then "handed it to the officer" to examine. (Ex.A, 11 :33 :45-11 :34:05; 7/17 /18 Tr., p.29,
Ls.1-4.) The officer observed it was amphetamine legally prescribed for Mr. Dewitt. (7/17/18
Tr., p.30, Ls.20-22.)
After examining the pill bottle and returning it to Mr. Dewitt, Officer Marrott took the
driver's license and other documents from Mr. Dewitt and examined them, then noted that the
registration he had been handed had expired the previous year. (11 :34:07-11 :34:44.) Officer
Marrott waited briefly while Mr. Dewitt continued to look for a current registration, and during
that wait, asked Mr. Dewitt how long it took to travel from Pekin to Twin Falls, and Mr. Dewitt
answered that it took him about twenty-eight hours. (Ex.A, 11:34:45.) Officer Marrott walked

3

back to his patrol car with the driver's license and other4 vehicle documentation in hand and told
Mr. Dewitt ifhe found a current vehicle registration, to waive it at him. (Ex.A, 11:36:05-12.)
Once back in his patrol car, Officer Marrott called in the driver's information to dispatch.
(Ex.A, 11 :36:25 - 11 :30:0). The officer then ran a google maps search on the travel reported by
Mr. Dewitt (Pekin, Illinois to Twin Falls), which showed a travel time of twenty-two hours,
which was six hours less than Mr. Dewitt's answer. (Ex.A, 11 :40:08.) Officer Marrott then told
dispatch that based on this time discrepancy, and his observations of Mr. Dewitt back at the car,
he had "reasonable suspicion" to believe Mr. Dewitt was involved in criminal activity; Officer
Marrott did not wait for dispatch to return information, nor did he conduct any further tasks
related to the traffic violation. (See generally, Ex.A, 11 :40:08.) Officer Marrott left his patrol car
and made the same announcement to Mr. Dewitt, telling Mr. Dewitt he was now being detained
due to reasonable suspicion of drug activity. (Ex.A, 11 :40:40 - 11 :40:35.) He had Mr. Dewitt
step out of the car and requested permission to search him; then he told Mr. Dewitt he was going
to run his drug dog around his car. (Ex.A, 11 :40:35 - 11 :43:30.)
Officer Marrott then took time to run his drug dog around Mr. Dewitt's car.

(Ex.A,

11 :44:38 - 11 :46: 15.) According to the officer's later testimony, the dog's behaviors indicated
the presence of drugs in Mr. Dewitt's car. (See R., p.133.) Based on the dog's response, Officer
Marrott searched the trunk of Mr. Dewitt's car and discovered duffle bags containing multiple
packages of marijuana. (R., p.133.)
Upon finding the marijuana Officer Marrott told Mr. Dewitt he was under arrest and read
his Miranda rights. (Ex.A, 11 :47:35 -11 :48: 16) Officer Marrott then faced Mr. Dewitt and said,

4

Officer Marrott testified he took the Mr. Dewitt's insurance paper (7/16/18 Tr., p.20, Ls.8-15);
the video indicates the officer took the expired registration (Ex.A, 11 :34:07-11 :35:00.)
4

"So, let's talk. You work with me, and I'll work with you the best I can." (Ex.A, 11 :48:20411 :48:45)

Officer Marrott gave Mr. Dewitt a choice, stating:
Hey I can work with you. I've got my narcotics team that can work with you.
We can help you out. If you're willing to work and talk. But if you're just going
to sit here and be quiet, I mean, that is your right, don't get me wrong, but if you
don't want to work, then we have no other option than to book you as is. Okay.
[As the officer and Mr. Dewitt are facing each other] So, I know you're not
getting this from Idaho. Okay. And if you are, tell me - you've got a valuable
piece of information - you may be sleeping in your own bed tonight [in audible]
if you work with me, we can get you on your way and get you working, alright?
But, you got to be truthful and you got to be honest with me."
(Ex.A, 11 :49:46)
Officer Marrott stopped talking and stood still, looking at Mr. Dewitt and waited for his
response. Mr. Dewitt looked down, and, after a ten-second pause, raised his head and looked
back at the officer and stated, "Without my lawyer" and then shook his head side to side. (Ex.A,
11:49-46 - 11:49:57.) The officer then said, "Okay," and tapped him on the chest and prepared

to search Mr. Dewitt's clothing; he also told Mr. Dewitt they would be calling for another officer
to transport him, since Officer Marrott' s patrol vehicle was occupied by his dog. (Ex.A,
11 :49:58- 11 :50: 12.)

As Officer Marrott started searching through Mr. Dewitt's clothing, however, the officer
asked, "how much you got on you?" and asked how much the drugs would sell for in Illinois;
Mr. Dewitt responded by providing incriminating statements and resumed talking with the
officer. (11 :51 :25.)

The officer continued asking about Mr. Dewitt's drug activities, and

Mr. Dewitt continued making incriminating statements. (Ex.A, 11 :54:20 -12:00:00.)

5

Based on the evidence obtained during the stop and investigation, the State charged
Mr. Dewitt with trafficking in marijuana. (R., pp.8-13.) Mr. Dewitt filed a motion to suppress
and a supporting memorandum. (R., pp.87, 97.)
Mr. Dewitt's motion sought suppression on three grounds. First, he claimed that Officer
Marrott violated his Fourth Amendment rights, as set forth in Rodriguez v United States, 575
U.S. _, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015), and State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 607 (2016), by
unlawfully prolonging the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion of that Mr. Dewitt was
engaged in any crime. (R., pp.101-03.) He asserted the officer deviated from the purpose of the
traffic stop, unlawfully extending that stop, by making inquiries that were unrelated to the
mission of the traffic stop in three specific instances: (1) by questioning Mr. Dewitt regarding
his travel, before ever asking him for his driver's license and vehicle information; (2) by
interrupting the legitimate tasks related to the traffic stop to investigate Mr. Dewitt's possession
of prescription medications, including having Mr. Dewitt retrieve the pill bottle and answer
questions about that medication; and (3) when the officer completely abandoned the original
purpose of the traffic stop to conduct a drug investigation based on observations that did not give
rise to reasonable suspicion of drug or other criminal activity. (R., pp. IO 1-03.)
Second, Mr. Dewitt claimed that Officer Marrott violated his Fourth Amendment rights
by searching the trunk of his vehicle without probable cause, arguing that Officer Marrott' s
interpretation of the drug dog's behaviors was insufficient to provide probable cause to believe
the trunk of the car contained drugs. (R., pp.103-04.)
Third, Mr. Dewitt claimed that Officer Marrott violated his Fifth Amendment right by
continuing to question him after he had invoked his right to counsel.

6

The State filed a brief in opposition that did not respond to Mr. Dewitt's claim that the
officer deviated from the mission of the traffic stop, unlawfully extending the detention, by
making inquiries about Mr. Dewitt's travel before asking for his driver's license and
investigating his possession of prescription medications. (R., pp.116-21.) Indeed, the State did
not even acknowledge the application of Rodriguez and Linze regarding these claims.

generally, R., pp.116-21.)

(See

The State instead argued only that, by the time Officer Marrott

conducted the dog sniff, the officer had sufficient facts to justify a reasonable suspicion.
(R., pp.116-21.)
The district court denied Mr. Dewitt's motion to suppress. (R., pp.130-40.) However,
like the State, the district court did not address Mr. Dewitt's initial claims of unconstitutional
prolonging; it did not decide whether the officer had unlawfully extended the stop with his
inquiries about travel, or by interrupting traffic safety-related tasks to investigate Mr. Dewitt's
prescription drugs. (See generally R., pp.130-38.) Rather, the district court framed the issue as
whether the officer had unlawfully extended the traffic stop by deploying the drug dog, and if so,
whether such an extension of time was justified by reasonable suspicion. (R., pp.134-3 8.)
As to this question, the district court found no unlawful pro longing because the duration
of the stop, with the drug investigation, was "typical" of other traffic stops conducted by Officer
Marrott, because Officer Marrott was "waiting for a return from dispatch on Dewitt's
information," and because "Dewitt had still not provide Marrott with a valid vehicle
registration." (R., p.137.) The district court alternatively found that if the traffic stop had been
extended, the extension was justified by Officer Marrott's reasonable suspicion that Mr. Dewitt
was engaged in criminal activity. (R., p.13 7.)

7

The district court also concluded that the drug dog's behavior provided Officer Marrott
probable cause to search Mr. Marrott's car, and therefore denied suppression of the evidence
found in the trunk.

(R., pp.132-48.)

Regarding Mr. Dewitt's Fifth Amendment claim, the

district court concluded that Mr. Dewitt's statements, "without my lawyer" and shaking his head,
made in response to the officer's request to talk and help him, was ambiguous, and not a clear
unequivocal request for counsel. (R., p.145.)
Following the denial of his suppression motion, Mr. Dewitt entered a conditional plea of
guilty to marijuana trafficking, reserving his right to appeal the district court's decision. ( 1/10/ 19
Tr., p.48, Ls.17-125.) The district court imposed a sentence of seven years, with two-years
fixed. (R., p.163 .) Mr. Miller filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., p.170.)

8

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Dewitt's motion to suppress?

9

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Dewitt's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Dewitt asserts, as he did in the district court, that Officer Marrott violated his Fourth

Amendment rights by conducting investigations unrelated to the mission of the traffic stop, and
without reasonable suspicion, thereby unlawfully prolonging his detention. Officer Marrott also
violated Mr. Dewitt's Fifth Amendment rights by continuing with questioning after Mr. Dewitt
had invoked his right to counsel. Suppression should have been granted.
B.

Standard Of Review
This Court defers to the district court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous, but

freely reviews whether the facts surrounding the search and seizure satisfy constitutional
requirements. State v. Downing, 163 Idaho 26, 29 (2017). This Court defers to the district
court's factual findings absent a showing that the findings are clearly erroneous. Id. However,
where the appellate court has exactly the same evidence before it as was considered by the
district court, the appellate court does not extend the usual deference to the district court's
evaluation of the evidence. "Under these limited circumstances, the appellate court's role is to
freely review the evidence and weigh the evidence in the same manner as the trial court would
do." State v. Lanliford, 162 Idaho 477, 492 (2017).
C.

Officer Marrott Unlawfully Prolonged The Traffic Stop In Violation Of Mr. Dewitt's
Fourth Amendment Rights
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Evidence obtained in violation of
10

Fourth Amendment protections is subject to the exclusionary rule, which requires the
suppression of both primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure,
and evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality, that is, “fruit of the
poisonous tree.” See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963); State v. Guzman,
122 Idaho 981, 988-98 (1992).
“The seizure of a vehicle’s occupants in order to investigate a traffic violation is a
‘reasonable seizure’ under the Fourth Amendment so long as the seizing officer had reasonable
suspicion that a violation had occurred.” Linze, 161 Idaho at 608 (quoting Rodriguez v. United
States, 575 U.S. _, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015). “A seizure justified only by a police-observed
traffic violation … becomes unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to
complete the mission of the traffic stop.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S._, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015).
As to the tasks related to “the mission of the traffic stop,” the U.S. Supreme Court has stated:
Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission includes
“ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.” Typically such inquiries involve
checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants
against the driver, and inspecting the automobile's registration and proof of
insurance. These checks serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic
code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.
Rodriguez, 575 U.S._, 135 S.Ct. at 1614.
The Fourth Amendment also tolerates “certain unrelated investigations that [do] not
lengthen the roadside detention.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at _, 135 S.Ct. at 1614. These “unrelated
investigations” include questioning, and dog sniffs. Id. “An officer, in other words, may
conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop. But … he may not do
so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify
detaining an individual.” Id.

11

A "po lice stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was
made violates the Constitution's shield against unreasonable seizures." Id., at 1612. Additional
tasks, unrelated to the mission of the traffic stop, that extend the duration of the seizure violate
the Fourth Amendment, even if the intrusion is otherwise deemed "de minimis." Id.
Ultimately, however, if an officer makes unrelated inquiries or investigations, the officer
"will inevitably lengthen the time" of the traffic stop, see Linze, 161 Idaho at 608; unless the
added time is justified by its own reasonable suspicion, the prolonging violates the Fourth
Amendment. Rodriguez, 575 U.S._, 135 S.Ct. at 1616; Linze, 161 Idaho at 608. "This rule is
both broad and inflexible. It applies to all extensions of traffic stops including those that could
reasonably be considered de minimis." Linze, 161 Idaho at 608 (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S._,
135 S.Ct. at 1615-16 (emphasis added)).
The burden is on the State to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify was
sufficiently limited both in scope, and duration. State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 361-62
(Ct. App. 2000) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983)).

1.

Officer Marrott's Unrelated Travel Inquiries, Made Prior To Requesting
Mr. Dewitt's Driver's License and Registration, Unlawfully Extended The
Detention

The district court erroneously concluded there was no unlawful extension of the traffic
stop. (See R., p.138.) The district court's conclusion ignores the undisputed testimony and video
evidence establishing that, in the initial minutes of the traffic stop investigation, after Officer
Marrott finished advising Mr. Dewitt of the reason for the traffic stop, but before the officer had
asked Mr. Dewitt if he had a license, registration, or insurance, Officer Marrott took time to ask
Mr. Dewitt a series of questions seeking information about Mr. Dewitt's travel. (Ex.A, 11 :32:20
-11:32:47; 7/16/18 Tr., p.27, Ls.8-22.) While such inquiries may generally be permissible during

12

a traffic stop, Officer Marrott’s questioning was unrelated to the mission of the traffic stop,
andursuant to Rodriquez, permissible only to the extent it did not prolong the stop. 575 U.S. _,
135 S.Ct. at 1615-16.
The undisputed evidence establishes that Officer Marrott took approximately forty-five
seconds to question Mr. Dewitt about his travel. (Ex,A., 11:32:20 – 11:33:04; 7/16/18 Tr., p.27,
Ls.8-22.) During that period, Officer Marrott asked Mr. Dewitt where he was coming from that
day and where he was headed; where was “home” and how long had he been “out here.” (Ex.A,
11:32:20 -11:32:47; 7/16/18 Tr., p.27, Ls.8-22.)

When asked how his request for travel

information was relevant to the purpose of the traffic stop, Officer Marrott testified only that it
was “a standard question” he asked everyone. (7/16/18 Tr., p.27, Ls.16-17.)
Officer Marrott’s testimony and the video evidence confirm that Officer Marrott’s route
and travel inquiries were made after he had explained the reason for the stop and related traffic
safety concerns, but before the officer ever asked Mr. Dewitt whether he had a driver’s license
and before the officer asked him to produce any vehicle information. (Ex.11:33:04; see also
7/16/18 Tr., p.27, Ls.8-20.)
Notwithstanding this clear and undisputed evidence the district court erroneously found
that “Marrott asked Dewitt for his driver’s license, proof of insurance, and vehicle registration”
(R., p.132, finding #4), and that “While waiting for Dewitt to produce the requested documents,
Marrott asked several standard questions about the origin and destination of Dewitt’s trip.”
(R., p.132, finding #5.) To the extent the district court’s factual findings conflict with the
undisputed evidence establishing that Officer Marrott made unrelated travel inquiries prior to
requesting Mr. Dewitt’s documentation, the district court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous
and cannot stand.

13

Contrary to the district court's factual findings and legal conclusions, Officer Marrott
unlawfully extended Mr. Dewitt's detention, violating his Fourth Amendment rights. The State
failed to constitutionally justify the unrelated inquiry. Suppression should have been granted.

2.

Officer Marrott's Questioning Into Mr. Dewitt's Possession Of Illegal And
Prescription Drugs Was Unrelated To The Mission Of The Traffic Stop And
Unlawfully Prolonged The Detention

Officer Marrott additionally violated Mr. Dewitt's Fourth Amendment rights when the
officer deviated from the traffic safety-related tasks in order to conduct an unrelated
investigation of the prescription medications that Mr. Dewitt possessed.

Although this

interruption was a basis of Mr. Dewitt's claim (R., p .101), the district court's factual findings are
erroneous because they fail to even mention these critical facts, referring instead only generally
to the fact that the officer asked questions about controlled substances and fail to mention that
the officer took time to investigate Mr. Dewitt's medications. (R., p.132, #5.)
The officer asked Mr. Dewitt ifhe had "prescription pills, anything like that?" (11:33:45)
In response to this question, Mr. Dewitt indicated he had prescription pills; and the officer then
asked, "are they prescribed to you?" (Ex.A, 11:33:45-11:34:05.) In response to this questioning
- and as shown by the video and confirmed by Officer Marrott' s subsequent testimony,
Mr. Dewitt "stopped what he was doing" and retrieved the pill bottle from the glove box, and
then "handed it to the officer" to examine. (Ex.A, 11:33:45-11:34:05; 7/17/18 Tr., p.29, Ls.1-4.)
The officer observed it was amphetamine legally prescribed for Mr. Dewitt and then returned it
to Mr. Dewitt. (7 /17 /18 Tr., p.30, Ls.20-22.)
Because the officer's investigation into Mr. Dewitt's prescription medication was not
related to the mission of the traffic stop as defined by Rodriguez, and because the investigation
resulted in a deviation of from the purpose of the traffic stop, and because the State failed to

14

demonstrate the unrelated investigation was justified by its own reasonable suspicion, the district
court erred by concluding there was no unlawful extension of the stop. Suppression on this basis
should have been granted.

3.

Officer Marrott's Unrelated Task Of Deploying His Drug Dog Unlawfully
Extended The Detention Because The Officer Lack Objective Facts To Justify A
Reasonable Suspicion

Suppression should also have been granted because Officer Marrott abandoned original
purpose of the traffic stop to conduct a drug investigation without reasonable suspicion. The
district court erroneous concluded that Officer Marrott's conduct in taking time to deploy his
drug dog did not unlawfully extend the traffic stop.

(R., pp.134-37.)

The district court

concluded that the dog sniff did not prolong the stop, and alternatively that even if the dog sniff
prolonged the traffic stop, the extension was justified by the officer's reasonable suspicion. Both
conclusions are erroneous.

a.

The District Court Erred By Concluding That The Dog Sniff Did Not
Extend The Traffic Stop

The district court offered several reasons for concluding there was no extension of the
traffic stop. First, the district concluded that, because the stop in fact took no longer than a
"typical" traffic stop, there was no unconstitutional prolonging.

(R., pp.137-38.)

This

conclusion rests on a legal premise that there is a set "reasonable amount of time" for each stop,
and that premise was explicitly rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Rodriguez, and the Idaho
Supreme Court in Linze, which hold that an officer must always be diligent. See Linze, 161
Idaho at 609. The district court's reason conflicts with controlling precedent which holds that
any deviation from the original purpose of the traffic stop "will inevitably lengthen" the

detention. Linze, 161 Idaho at 608.
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The district court also concluded that deploying the drug dog did not extend the traffic
stop because Officer Marrott was “waiting for a return from dispatch on Dewitt’s information,”
and because “Dewitt had still not provided Marrott with a valid vehicle registration.” (R., p.137.)
The district court’s findings and conclusions are unsupported by the record and are contrary to
controlling precedent. By the time Officer Marrott decided to deploy his drug dog, he was
neither waiting for a license-check return from dispatch nor allowing Mr. Dewitt to continue
looking for his vehicle documents; rather, Officer Marrott had explicitly and unequivocally
abandoned the purpose of the traffic stop, right after he performed the google map search and
discovered the discrepancy in the travel times report by Mr. Dewitt.
The video shows clearly that, after discovering the travel time discrepancy, Officer
Marrott told dispatch that he had “reasonable suspicion” to believe Mr. Dewitt was involved in
criminal activity, and Officer Marrott left his patrol car and made the same announcement to
Mr. Dewitt, telling Mr. Dewitt he was now being detained due to reasonable suspicion of drug
activity. (Ex.A, 11:40:40 – 11:40:35.) He had Mr. Dewitt step out of the car and requested
permission to search him; then he told Mr. Dewitt he was going to run his drug dog around his
car.

(Ex.A, 11:40:35 – 11:43:30.)

Officer Marrott did not wait for dispatch to return

information, nor did he conduct any further tasks related to the traffic violation. (See generally,
Ex.A, 11:40:08.) Nor did the State present any evidence to show that the tasks tied to the
mission of the traffic stop had been transferred to any other officer. (See generally, 7/16/18 Tr.)
The district court’s conclusion that conducting the dog sniff did not extend the stop was legally
and factually erroneous.
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b.

Officer Marrott's Observations Did Not Give Rise To Reasonable
Suspicion

An officer's observations and events succeeding the initial stop may permit extending the
length and scope of a traffic stop, but only if there exist objective and specific articulable facts
that provide the constitutionally-required level of "reasonable suspicion" to justify an
investigative detention. An investigative detention is permissible only if it is based upon specific
articulable facts which justify suspicion "that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be
engaged in criminal activity." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983). The quantity
and quality of information necessary to establish reasonable suspicion is less than that necessary
to establish probable cause. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) Still, reasonable
suspicion requires more than a mere hunch. Id. at 329. Whether an officer possessed reasonable
suspicion is evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or before
the time of the detention. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); State v. Kelly, 160
Idaho 761, 763 (Ct. App. 2016). "Reasonable suspicion depends on the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life." Naverette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 402 (2014).
As explained below, the behaviors and items observed by the officer, even in their
aggregate, were not indicative of drug activity or any other criminal conduct and therefore did
not justify extending the stop to conduct a drug investigation.
Officer Marrott indicated that his suspicion was reasonable based on several factors. He
indicated first that Mr. Dewitt was extremely nervous. (See 7/16/18 Tr., p.17, L.7 - p.21, L.18.)
However, courts have made clear that "a nervous demeanor during an encounter with law
enforcement is of limited significance in establishing the presence of reasonable suspicion
because it is common for people to exhibit signs of nervousness when confronted with law
enforcement regardless of criminal activity. State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 919, 924 (Ct. App. 2016);
17

State v. Zuniga, 143 Idaho 431, 435 (Ct. App. 2006), State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 285-86 (Ct.

App. 2005). In the present case the signs of nervousness Officer Marrott observed are also
attributable to the amount of caffeine and legally-prescribed amphetamine in Mr. Dewitt's
system. (See 7/16/18 Tr., p.17, L.7 - p.21, L.18.) This factor does not add to the totality of the
circumstances, however, because Officer was aware that Mr. Dewitt was prescribed
amphetamine. (See 7/16/18 Tr., p.17, L.7 - p.21, L.18.) Officer Marrott also claims that the
vehicle having a single key in the ignition was a sign, based on his training and experience, of
drug activity. 5 (See 7/16/18 Tr., p.17, L. 7 - p.21, L.18.) Thousands of drivers wisely have only
one car key in the ignition and this factor does not add to reasonable suspicion. Additionally,
Officer Marrott claimed he had suspicion because Mr. Dewitt "didn't know where he was
coming from." This is not true and is belied by the record; Mr. Dewitt stated only that he did not
remember whether the name of the town where he visited was called Twin Falls or Twin Plains.
(See 7/16/18 Tr., p.17, L.7 - p.21, L.18.) This type of uncertainty on the part ofan out-of-state

motorist does not add to any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Without additional facts suggestive of drug activity or other criminal activity, these facts
are insufficient to justify prolonging the stop so that the officer can conduct a new drug
investigation. To hold otherwise would allow the traffic stops of the countless thousands of
long-distance travelers to result in drug investigations and prolonged detentions, and as such is
incompatible with the Fourth Amendment's requirement of reasonableness. Cf State v. Kelly,
160 Idaho 761, 763 (Ct. App. 2016) (concluding that using the interstate freeway, despite the
fact that it is used by individuals engaged in a host of criminal activity, "cannot give rise to a

5

There was no claim, nor evidence to support a claim, that Officer Marrott reasonably suspected
Mr. Dewitt was driving under the influence.
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reasonable suspicion to search a vehicle as it would subject thousands of innocent travelers to an
invasion of their privacy for no more reason that the use of the road.")

D.

Mr. Dewitt Clearly And Unequivocally Invoked His Right To Counsel And Officer
Marrott's Continued Questioning Violated Mr. Dewitt's Fifth Amendment Rights
In response to Officer Marrott's post-Miranda request that Mr. Dewitt talk instead of

sitting silent, Mr. Dewitt stated ''without my attorney" and shook his head side to side.
Mr. Dewitt's verbal and nonverbal statements clearly and unequivocally invoked his right to
counsel. The district court erred when it conclude that Mr. Dewitt's statements were ambiguous
and could have meant something else, and the statements obtained by Officer Marrott, after he
resumed questioning, should have been suppressed.
If the right to counsel has been invoked, the police may not reinitiate interrogation of the
detainee in the absence ofan attorney. Minnickv. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153-54 (1990). "A
suspect must unambiguously request counsel in order to invoke his Fifth Amendment right to
counsel-'he must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a
reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for
an attorney.'" State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 451 (2012) (quoting Davis v. United States, 512
U.S. 452, 459 (1994). "Where an individual asserts his right to counsel, the interrogation must
cease until counsel has been made available to him, or until he himself "initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
477, 485 (1981). The standard for determining whether a detainee has invoked the right to
counsel is an objective one; his statements must be "sufficiently clear that a reasonable police
officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney."

Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 470 (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 459).
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In this case, Mr. Dewitt's verbal and nonverbal statements unambiguously invoked his
right to counsel, and his desire to remain silent without his attorney present. The invocation of
the right is made clear from the context in which it was made; Officer Marrott had just invited
Mr. Dewitt to speak and gave Mr. Dewitt an ultimatum::
We can help you out. If you're willing to work and talk. But ifyou're just going to
sit here and be quiet, I mean, that is your right, don't get me wrong, but if you
don't want to work, then we have no other option than to book you as is. Okay.
[Officer Marrott and Mr. Dewitt face each other] So, I know you're not getting
this from Idaho. Okay. And if you are, tell me - you've got a valuable piece of
information - you may be sleeping in your own bed tonight [in audible} if you
work with me, we can get you on your way and get you working, alright? But,
you got to be truthful and you got to be honest with me."
(Ex.A, 11:49:46 (emphasis added).)
Then Officer Marrott stopped talking and waited for his response. (Ex.A, 11 :49-46 11:49:57.) Mr. Dewitt looked down, took a ten-second pause and then raised his head and
looked at the officer and stated, "without my lawyer," then shook his head side-to-side. ( 11 :4946 - 11 :49:57.)
In their context, Mr. Dewitt's verbal and nonverbal statements demonstrate his clear and
unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel.

Officer Marrott's subsequent questioning of

Mr. Dewitt violated that right. Suppression of Mr. Dewitt's statements should therefore have
been granted.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Dewitt respectfully asks that this Court reverse the district court's order denying
suppression, vacate his judgment of conviction for marijuana trafficking, and remand his case to
the district court for further proceedings and to allow Mr. Dewitt to withdraw his guilty plea.
DATED this 20th day of June, 2019.
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